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Articles/Essays
THE ROLE OF INSIDE COUNSEL IN THE
1990s: A VIEW FROM OUTSIDE
Marc I. Steinberg*
AN ESSAY FOR KEN PYEJ am honored and pleased to contribute to this Issue of the SMU Law
Review dedicated to A. Kenneth Pye. I did not know Ken Pye for a
long period of time, but I feel fortunate that our paths crossed. Ar-
riving at SMU during our athletic fallout, he invigorated this university.
Ken Pye's integrity, energy, insight, straight talk, and commitment to high
standards were valued and appreciated.
Unfortunately, we all have far too little time on this earth. In this short
time, many of us strive to make a meaningful contribution. Ken Pye cer-
tainly succeeded. The conversation we had that I cherish the most was
our briefest and our last. It was graduation day in May 1994. In spite of
being terribly ill, he carried on with the ceremonial duties that were the
order of the day. My role that day was to help host the recipient of an
honorary degree. After the luncheon for the honorary degree recipients,
Ken personally thanked me for my efforts that day. Fortunately, my re-
ply was "Ken, I thank you for everything you've done for SMU." These
were the last words we spoke, and I remember them fondly.
The subject of this article-the role of inside counsel in the 1990s-is
one that I think Ken Pye would have liked. Ken considered it important
for the business community and the legal profession to have close ties
with SMU. Given the increasing importance of inside counsel's impact
on corporate governance, efficiency, and law compliance, this subject is
indeed timely.
I. CHANGING NATURE OF INSIDE COUNSEL'S POSITION
One may inquire, of course, whether it is curious for a law professor
who has never served as inside counsel to opine on this subject. As a law
professor and legal consultant, I certainly do not have the experience and
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University
School of Law. Of Counsel, Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C. Copyright 1996 by Marc I.
Steinberg. All rights reserved.
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insights equal to those who are inside counsel. Nonetheless, with those
caveats, I will provide my thoughts.
The role of inside counsel has changed dramatically in the last two de-
cades. As Irving Shapiro, former general counsel of DuPont, remarked:
In the past, businessmen wore blinders. After hours, they would run
to their club, play golf with other businessmen, have a martini-and
that was about it .... In a world where [g]overnment simply took
taxes from you and did not interfere with your operations, maybe
that idea was sensible. In today's world, it is not.'
Reflecting upon the status of inside counsel in the 1950s, H.J. Aibel, chief
legal officer of ITT, commented that "then the generally accepted wis-
dom [was] that jobs in corporate law departments were for second raters,
or lawyers who had failed to make partner at some of the better firms."'2
How things have changed. Today, the issues that lawyers practicing in-
house face certainly are as multifaceted and challenging as those posed in
law firms. Indeed, inside counsel plays an active role in shaping corpo-
rate events, in assessing corporate policies, and in establishing the tone
and standard for corporate conduct.3
Interestingly, as I visit with my former students as well as other practi-
tioners, it is striking how many of them seek opportunities to go "in-
house." The reasons focus on the fixation on billable hours in private
practice, the stress associated with client development, and the competi-
tive environment of law firm practice. Having this view, an increasing
number of attorneys perceive their private practice as detrimental to their
quality of life. They also recognize other distinct advantages relating to
such matters as health benefits, retirement plans, and stock programs. 4
On the other hand, inside counsel faces the situation of being "wed-
ded" to his or her client. Generally, when outside counsel has a "diffi-
cult" client, one that fails to timely pay its bills, or one that engages in
unethical conduct, the attorney may "walk" from that client.5 The attor-
ney certainly may miss the revenues that otherwise would be generated
but normally has the economic leeway to resign from the engagement.
However, when inside counsel's client is unduly "difficult" or behaves
1. Marshall Loeb, The Corporate Chiefs' New Class, TiME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 87 (quot-
ing Irving Shapiro).
2. H. J. Aibel, Corporate Counsel and Business Ethics: A Personal Review, 59 Mo. L.
REv. 427, 427 (1994).
3. MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A CORPORATE AND SE-
CURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 251 (1983); Harold M. Williams, The Role of Inside Counsel
in Corporate Accountability, Speech Before the 17th Annual Corporate Council Institute(Oct. 4, 1979), in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,318, at 82,369
(1979).
4. See Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481-90 (1989). See generally Richard
Gruner, Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Counsel: An Information Processing
Analysis, 9 J. CORP. L. 217 (1984); John C. Taylor 3rd, The Role of Corporate Counsel, 32
RUTGERS L. REv. 237 (1979).
5. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 & crts.(1995); James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of
Duty, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 641 (1988).
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improperly, counsel must either tolerate such conduct or find another
job. Hence, being in-house counsel makes separation and divorce far
more onerous. This situation may be especially troublesome for senior
in-house lawyers who may find great difficulty in procuring another posi-
tion with comparable remuneration. 6
This "marital" relationship to one's client, of course, has key attributes.
One particularly attractive one is that inside counsel is very much at the
center of corporate compliance and the legal functions of the enterprise.
Moreover, in many corporations, being involved in business strategy, in-
side counsel has the financial acumen to understand the benefits and risks
of a prospective venture and to communicate effectively economic as-
pects of a contemplated "deal." Having this input makes inside counsel's
contribution that much more important. In these functions, inside coun-
sel seeks to be perceived within the enterprise as a "can do yes person"
yet retain the leverage effectively to "say no" when appropriate. 7
II. HIRING OUTSIDE COUNSEL
Before delving into the "legal" issues, a word should be said about the
subject of corporations hiring outside counsel. Relevant factors include
the quality, areas of specialization, and number of in-house lawyers at the
particular enterprise; the complexity of the project at hand; the scope and
duration of the project; the presence of conflicts of interest; and time
pressures. The size, sophistication, and expertise of the in-house legal
staff will play the key role in how. frequently, the services of outside attor-
neys will be used. 8
When retaining outside counsel, should a corporation hire one law firm
to act as general outside counsel or a number of different law firms as
called for by the situations at hand? With respect to an enterprise of
relatively small size or one that engages in limited activities, it often
makes good sense to retain one outside general counsel. That way the
law firm has greater incentive to understand the corporation's culture,
can handle the corporation's legal affairs in a more cost effective manner,
and may be persuaded to bill at more economical rates. The potential
risk, however, is that, if the retained attorney or law firm derives a sub-
stantial amount of revenue from the enterprise, such outside counsel may
lose objectivity and render advice to the liking of the chief executive of-
6. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the Cor-
porate Accountability Process, 4 CORP. L. REV. 3, 6 (1981).
7. See John J. Creedon, Lawyer and Executive-The Role of the General Counsel, 39
Bus. LAW. 25 (1983); How Agile is Your Legal Department?, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
1995, at 1, 5 (quoting statements by McDonald's Corp. assistant general counsel Ira S.
Feldman that "[a ll of the lawyers at McDonald's become intimately involved on the busi-
ness side" and that "lawyer[s] ... wear[ ] two hats: a business hat as well as [a] legal hat").
See generally Symposium, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
8. See Howard J. Aibel, Successful Teaming of Inside and Outside Counsel to Serve
the Corporate Client, 38 Bus. LAW. 1587, 1589-90 (1983); Sally A. Ramirez, Spending on
Outside Counsel Fees Is Down, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at C14.
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ficer or other high-level executive rather than for the benefit of the client,
which is the corporate entity. This occurrence has arisen with some fre-
quency.9 Independence, integrity, and competence are essential attrib-
utes that may be lost when outside counsel becomes obsessed with
placating a high-level executive rather than diligently representing his or
her client's interests. 10
To an increasing degree, the larger corporations elect to retain a
number of outside law firms rather than one outside general counsel. In
so doing, many of these companies actively interview a number of firms
prior to selection, engage in a competitive bid process, and seek favorable
billing practices. 1 The upside to this approach is that theoretically the
enterprise can hire the best counsel at the best price for a given assign-
ment. A concern, however, is that in reality the outside attorney for the
"moment" may not have the same intensity of "zeal" to foster the client's
interest as would general outside counsel of long-standing duration.12
Moreover, when several different law firms are employed, there is a
much greater risk of attorney conflicts of interest arising. For example,
attorney disqualification arises when the law firm that currently is repre-
senting the corporation had been previously retained by a person whose
interests are materially adverse to such corporation in a matter that is
substantially related. Without reasonably informed consent by the for-
mer client to the subsequent representation, the law firm normally will be
disqualified, thereby denying the corporation the counsel of its choice.'3
Depending on the factual scenario, however, these conflict rules also
can be used as a sword by the corporation to disqualify former counsel
from representing an adversary. 14 TWo Fifth Circuit decisions, the Ameri-
9. See, e.g., In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847
(SEC 1981); see also Mike France, New Corporate Strategy Leaves Firms Trembling, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 31, 1994, at Al (stating that "a growing number of American corporations... are
consolidating their legal work-firing most of their outside attorneys and negotiating vol-
ume discounts with the lucky survivors").
10. See Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Acquisitions, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 600 (1988) ("The loss of a major client often causes a financial setback
for members of a firm, and the loss of a few such clients may spell catastrophe.").
11. See generally Aibel, supra note 8, at 1601-03; France, supra note 9, at Al.
12. Aibel, supra note 8, at 1595-96; see also Luther C. McKinney, Relationship with
Outside Counsel, 34 Bus. LAW. 921 (1979).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.9 (1995); see, e.g., Smith v.
Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980); T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See gener-
ally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 7.1 (1986); Robert H. Aronson,
Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1977); Samuel R. Miller et al., Conflicts of
Interest in Corporate Litigation, 48 Bus. LAW. 141 (1992); Samuel R. Miller & Irwin H.
Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus.
LAW. 631 (1985); Rick R. Rothman, Conflicts of Interest: Subsequent Adverse Representa-
tion, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 119 (1988); Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attor-
ney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1
(1990); Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of Interest Issues, 50 Bus. LAW. 1381
(1995).
14. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1244, 1319-20 (1981); see also sources cited supra note 13.
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can Airlines15 and Dresser16 cases, impact on this analysis. These deci-
sions signify that disqualification motions brought in the Fifth Circuit are
governed by federal standards. Hence, even though a course of conduct
is allowed under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, it
still may be impermissible under federal law. Applicable standards, ac-
cording to the court, include the Texas Disciplinary Rules, the American
Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the American
Law Institute's Draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.17 Ap-
plying all of these standards at once can lead at times to differing results,
thereby making preventive counseling in this setting a challenging task. 18
III. COUNSEL'S ROLE INSIDE THE BOARDROOM
With respect to counsel's role inside the boardroom, it is essential, of
course, for counsel to comprehend the business dynamics of the enter-
prise and possess the acumen to understand the economics of the transac-
tion or other matter being considered.' 9 Counsel's role also encompasses
the implementation of internal procedures to reduce the threat of subse-
quent litigation. In this regard, the business judgment rule serves as an
impressive shield to deflect otherwise successful challenges to board
action.20
Stated succinctly, the business judgment rule has four components.
First, the board of directors must focus on the issue and make a delibera-
tive decision (which may be a determination to engage in the contem-
plated action or to abstain from such action).2 ' Second, the board's
decision must be reasonably informed. In this regard, the board should
be provided with adequate information, including (where appropriate)
pertinent reports (either internally generated or from outside sources),
appraisals, and other material documents central to the transaction or
other matter at issue. Once having such information before it, the board
should take the time necessary to reach an informed decision.22 Third,
15. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
912 (1993).
16. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
17. Id. at 543-45; American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 610-11.
18. See generally Jeffrey Garon, Comment, Successive Conflicts of Interest and the Mo-
tion to Disqualify: The Impact of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, 47 SMU L. REV.
399 (1994).
19. See sources cited supra note 7.
20. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01 & cmt. (1994); DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCI-
ARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995).
21. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that the business judgment rule is "a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company"); cf Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del.
1963) (because the board of directors never focused on the issue, the business judgment
rule analysis was not applied).
22. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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directors making the board's determination must be disinterested, signify-
ing that they are not engaged in self-dealing, do not have a disproportion-
ate financial stake in the transaction, and are not under the control or
domination of a director who has such a disabling conflict of interest.23
With the increase in the number of outside directors serving on corporate
boards who have no other affiliation with such enterprises, this problem
has been significantly lessened.24 Last, the decision must have a rational
basis or, stated differently, must be made without gross negligence.25
In this context, process is key. If the board abides by the procedural
framework set forth above, courts will be reluctant to second-guess a de-
liberative decision reached in good faith by a reasonably informed
board.26 Hence, inside counsel's role here is to guide the board through
this process, leaving a trail that will insulate the decision from successful
attack.
Of course, in conflict of interest transactions, such as interested direc-
tor transactions with a controlling shareholder, parent-subsidiary merg-
ers, and leveraged buy-outs engineered by incumbent management, even
more attention to process may be necessitated. In such situations, estab-
lishment of a committee comprised of the disinterested directors may be
called for as well as appointment of special counsel for the committee. 27
As decisions such as Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.28 evidence, deficiency in
process accompanied by the specter of overreaching by the control group
heightens the scrutiny that courts will apply. To allay this prospect, par-
ticipation by reasonably informed outside directors who have sufficient
leverage to negotiate with the control group in an effective manner will
dissuade a court from upsetting the subject transaction.29 Playing a key
role in this setting, inside counsel orchestrates the process in such a man-
ner as to hopefully further the best interests of the corporation, share-
holders, and other affected constituencies. 30
23. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del.
1971); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. 1960).
24. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
25. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 858; Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.),
affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (per curiam).
26. See ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 20, § 4.01 &
§ 4.01(a) cmt.; see also Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 Bus. LAW. 1427, 1443
(1995) (observing that "courts are willing to defer to the deliberative, independent deci-
sions of boards under the business judgment rule").
27. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
28. 457 A.2d at 701.
29. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES
§ 15.04 (1995).
30. With respect to the interests of other constituencies, see, e.g., Symposium, Corpo-




Law compliance today is ever present on the corporate landscape. In-
side counsel is a pivotal figure in the practice of preventive law.
Although we are in an era of deregulation, we also are in a period of
increased criminalization. What was acted upon as a civil enforcement
matter a decade ago is more likely to be brought as a criminal action
today.31 The federal criminal sentencing guidelines reflect this attitude32
and recognize that the subject corporation's establishment of an effective
and operational law compliance program constitutes a mitigating factor in
determining the appropriate sentence. 33
Law compliance, however, is not a revolutionary concept. Indeed, the
American Bar Association's Corporate Directors' Guidebook identifies
law compliance as a "significant aspect of the board's responsibility. ' 34
In corporations with multifaceted operations, such law compliance pro-
grams may cover such diverse areas as antitrust, environmental policies,
employment and hiring practices, and securities.3 5 Inside counsel's role
in helping to administer and oversee an enterprise's law compliance pro-
gram is critical.
When rendering advice with respect to law compliance, counsel may
consider the following:
1. Although no system is "bullet-proof," the corporation should keep
in mind that, if a violation were to occur, it would have the burden of
showing that its law compliance program (Program) is reasonably
effective.
2. The subject corporation's board of directors should adopt the Pro-
gram, and the Program should be administered under the board's super-
vision as an integral part of its monitoring function. On a periodic basis,
the board should review the Program for possible revision.
3. The Program's scope should reflect the nature of the enterprise's
business and the legal issues such enterprise realistically may face. Given
the economic practicalities involved and with the proviso that the law
must be obeyed, an objective cost/benefit analysis normally is appropri-
31. See generally Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Ex-
ecutive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAW. 617 (1994).
32. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed.
Reg. 22,762, 22,787-88 (1991); Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 55 Fed.
Reg. 46,600, 46,603-04 (1990). See generally CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COM-
PLIANCE AND MITIGATION (Jed S. Rakoff et al. eds., 1993).
33. 55 Fed. Reg. 46,600, 46,604 (1990). The guidelines set forth "seven general types
of steps" for such a compliance program, including effective training, monitoring, and en-
forcement, as well as the designation of high-level personnel with overall responsibility for
compliance. Id. at 46,605. See generally Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical
Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting
the Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375 (1993).
34. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 31 (2d ed.
1994).
35. 1d; see Steven P. Reynolds, International Antitrust Compliance for a Company
with Multinational Operations, 8 INT'L Q. 76 (1996); Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher,
Compliance Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1994).
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ate. Certainly, an enterprise engaged in several different businesses with
operations abroad should be expected to develop a more extensive pro-
gram than one with purely local operations specializing in a particular
product market.
4. The Program (such as a Code of Conduct) should be disseminated
to and understood by all affected company personnel.
5. To integrate the Program into the corporation's culture and to help
ensure continued personnel compliance, educational seminars should be
conducted on a periodic basis. Moreover, consideration should be given
to the question whether affected personnel should be required to certify
annually that they have complied with the applicable Code(s) of Conduct.
6. The Program should be effectively administered. In this regard, the
enterprise should not adopt any non-essential aspect of a prospective
Program that it cannot feasibly implement. For example, a corporation's
failure to obtain annual compliance certificates from a significant number
of affected personnel may prove more harmful when such a component is
contained in the corporation's Program.
7. The Program should be subject to adequate enforcement, such as
spot checks, board of director (or delegated committee) review, "whistle
blower" protection, and the taking of meaningful disciplinary action
against those who fail to comply. 36
The adoption and implementation of a worthy law compliance program
benefits the affected corporation, its shareholders, and the community at
large. A sufficiently comprehensive and effectively implemented Pro-
gram should reduce the risk of significant liability exposure and should be
deemed a mitigating factor if a violation were to occur. 37
In this setting, inside counsel regularly provides advice to employees
and management concerning compliance, investigates alleged policy vio-
lations, and consults with management as to what steps to take when vio-
lations are uncovered. Normally, such advice by counsel is implemented.
However, in the rare company where such advice is not followed and the
situation at hand involves a violation of law likely to result in substantial
injury to such enterprise, counsel must take affirmative action. Looking
to senior management to guide an appropriate response is certainly the
preferable option. In certain situations, it may be prudent to procure a
separate legal opinion. If those efforts fail, counsel should inform the
corporation's board of directors of the subject violation and the correc-
tive measures to be taken. If the board declines to implement these
measures, counsel must resign from his or her employment (and, in a
number of jurisdictions, may reveal confidential information to the extent
necessary to investors and regulatory agencies). Resignation in such cir-
cumstances certainly is a drastic step, resulting in loss of employment, but
36. See Aibel, supra note 2, at 435-39; Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Mini-
mizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Con-
duct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990).
37. See sources cited supra notes 31-36.
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nonetheless may be required under applicable ethical standards.38
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) fairly recent Feuer-
stein Report39 and its well known Carter-Johnson proceeding4° illustrate
this dilemma. As the Commission pointed out, inside counsel may be
charged with both ethical and supervisory responsibilities under the fed-
eral securities laws. In such circumstances, in-house counsel simply can-
not advise senior management and then decline to ascertain whether such
advice is being implemented. Rather, counsel must remain alert to devel-
opments and, if corrective measures are not taken, must climb the corpo-
rate ladder. If the ultimate decision maker embodying the corporate
client-the board of directors-fails to take appropriate action, counsel's
recourse is resignation.41
In sum, inside counsel must be careful not to become a participant in
the client's illegality. 42 Generally, provided that the client listens in good
faith to the advice given, counsel should not be obligated to resign when a
legitimate question exists regarding the legality of corporate conduct. In
such circumstances, inside counsel's "energies should be channeled into
advising and prompting corporate management and the board of direc-
tors to engage in conduct that is both legal and ethical." '43
V. THREE KEY LITIGATION ISSUES
Inside counsel faces a seeming multitude of litigation issues. Three key
issues for the 1990s are explored here. The first issue emerges when the
subject corporation is involved in a government investigation, such as one
instituted by the SEC, and the Commission requests that the corporation
produce documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege (as
well as the work-product doctrine). Although wishing to be cooperative,
inside counsel should recognize that such production will likely result in a
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6(b), 1.13(b) (1995); TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.05(c), 1.12(b)-(c) (1995). See generally Joseph J.
Fleischman et al., The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and the Employment At-Will
Rule as Applied to In-House Counsel, 48 Bus. LAW. 611 (1993); Samuel H. Gruenbaum,
Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO.
L.J. 191 (1979); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest,
and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REv. 425 (1978).
39. In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067 (SEC
1992); see also William F. Kennedy, Professional Responsibility and the Inside Lawyer, 34
Bus. LAW. 867 (1979).
40. See In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 82,847 (SEC
1981).
41. Id. at 84,169-70; see also In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.(CCH) 85,067, at 83,608-09.
42. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978);
Simon M. Lome & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers Before the
SEC, 50 Bus. LAW. 1293 (1995).
43. Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 22; see MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C.
FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 4:27-28 (1985 &
Supp. 1995); see also Millstein, supra note 26, at 1431 ("Lawyers ... understand that in
most circumstances they render advice, and that taking or leaving that advice is the client's
role. The limit is when the lawyer's professional responsibilities require him or her to act
when the advice is ignored.").
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waiver of the privilege.44 Transmittal of the documents by the SEC to
other law enforcement bodies, such as the Department of Energy and the
Department of Justice, is a distinct possibility.45 Moreover, once the SEC
terminates its activity, plaintiffs' attorneys and others may seek produc-
tion of the applicable documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act.46 In light of these ramifications, inside counsel should respond cau-
tiously when faced with a government request to produce privileged
documents.
A second troubling issue arises when inside counsel learns that a corpo-
rate employee allegedly has violated the law. In this context, counsel
may give the employee "quasi-Miranda" warnings to the effect that
(a) [counsel's] role is to represent the organization, (b) an actual or
potential conflict of interest may exist between the organization and
the individual, (c) [counsel] cannot represent the individual, (d) their
conversation may not be confidential and any information the indi-
vidual provides may be used against [such individual], and (e) he [or
she] may wish to retain independent counsel. 47
A number of inside counsel argue against conveying these warnings to a
suspected erring employee, reasoning that so doing is not in the corpora-
tion's interest.4 8 On the other hand, failure to provide these warnings
may subject counsel to increased liability exposure, particularly where the
employee has a reasonable belief that counsel was personally represent-
ing the employee. In that event, an attorney-client relationship may be
implicated, thereby signifying that such communications between counsel
and the employee may be deemed confidential.4 9 Moreover, dual repre-
sentation of the corporate client and the employee may well constitute an
impermissible conflict.50
A third key issue may occur when the corporate client is in litigation
and a former executive is privy to the facts surrounding the litigation.
Can the adversary's counsel contact the corporate client's former execu-
44. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414
(3d Cir. 1991); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982); Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See generally Janet L. Hall, Note, "Limited Waiver" of
Protection Afforded by the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 981.
45. See, e.g., Permian, 665 F.2d at 1214. See generally Claire E. Furry, Note, Permian
Corporation v. United States and the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations: Unjusti-
fied Severity on the Issue of Waiver, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 223 (1982).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 200.80 (1995). See generally STEINBERG & FER-
RARA, supra note 43, § 7.03; Robert R. Belair, SEC FOIA Practice, 23 REv. SEC. & COM-
MoDrrIEs REG. 11 (1990); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act
for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REv. 119 (1984).
47. See Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 1, 20 (quoting Barry S. Martin, When Corporate Counsel Get Caught in the Middle,
CAL. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 75).
48. See, e.g., Aibel, supra note 2, at 438-39.
49. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1995); sources cited
supra notes 13-18.
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tive and speak with that former executive without corporate counsel be-
ing present? The answer may well be "yes." A number of cases as well as
ABA Ethics Opinion 91-359 state that opposing counsel can speak to for-
mer employees, even former top executives of an enterprise, with respect
to the facts and merits of the litigation without counsel for the corpora-
tion being there.5' The ABA Opinion cautions that counsel who is inter-
viewing the former employee must insure that a breach of the attorney-
client privilege does not occur.52 In other words, facts can be divulged
but not communications that are within the attorney-client privilege.
Note, however, that unlike the conflict of interest rules where there is a
presumption of shared confidences, 53 in this setting there is no such pre-
sumption. The corporation seeking to show that confidences have been
divulged has the burden of showing that is the case.54 Not surprisingly,
this is an area giving rise to contentious litigation.55
VI. COUNSEL AS DIRECTOR
Potential conflicts of interest and enhanced liability concerns abound
when counsel serves as a director of the corporate client. For outside
counsel, irrespective of this dilemma, the economic necessities may dic-
tate serving as a director. In some situations, senior executive officers
may feel strongly that outside general counsel should be an integral mem-
ber of the "team," thereby insisting that such counsel serve on the board.
To maintain the corporation as a client generating substantial legal fees,
outside counsel may acquiesce in this arrangement. 56
51. See Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341 (D. Conn. 1991); Polycast Technol-
ogy Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d
1030 (N.Y. 1990); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) [hereinafter ABA
Ethics Opinion] (interpreting Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, to con-
clude that "[tihe prohibition of Rule 4.2 with respect to contacts by a lawyer with employ-
ees of an opposing corporate party does not extend to former employees of that party").
But see Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745 F.
Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986);
Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J.Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with Employees and Former Employ-
ees of a Corporate Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAW. 1053 (1987); Louis A. Stahl, Ex
Parte Interviews with Enterprise Employees: A Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1181 (1987).
52. ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 51, at 6 (stating that "[t]he lawyer should also
punctiliously comply with the requirements of Rule 4.3, which addresses a lawyer's deal-
ings with unrepresented persons").
53. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 1.7, 1.9 (1995); sources
cited supra notes 13-18.
54. See, e.g., Dubois, 136 F.R.D. at 341; Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1030.
55. See Stabilus v. Haynsworth, No. 91-6184, 1992 WL 68563 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
1992) (stating that "[t]his issue has been struggled with by many courts and has resulted in
inconsistent decisions"); sources cited supra note 51.
56. See Lorne, supra note 38, at 490 (stating that "although several major law firms
continue to have partners serving on the boards of their clients, no legitimate basis exists
for allowing the practice to continue"); see also Lawyer-Directors are Key Targets for Plain-
tiffs' Lawyers, ABA Group Told, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1272 (1989) (quoting a
plaintiffs' attorney who stated that attorneys who serve as directors "have to be certifiably
nuts").
SMU LAW REVIEW
No such compulsion should exist with respect to inside counsel. Serv-
ing as director is fraught with risk for inside counsel. First, application of
the attorney-client privilege may be determined on an ad hoc basis de-
pending on whether the attorney/director was acting as legal counsel or as
a director. By assuming this dual function, therefore, the corporation's
assertion of the attorney-client privilege may be subject to stricter scru-
tiny.57 Second, by acting as director, counsel has a conflict between being
a "team player" while at the same time rendering dispassionate legal ad-
vice that will be received with respect and without hostility by the inside
directors. 58 Third, the counsel/director may be denied legal malpractice
insurance coverage by the carrier on the basis that the alleged improper
conduct did not involve the practice of law. If the subject corporation has
insufficient director and officer insurance coverage, as well as inadequate
indemnification resources, this problem is exacerbated. 59 Last, when
counsel steps out of his or her attorney's shoes and acts as director, coun-
sel's personal liability exposure is magnified. In such circumstances,
courts are more likely to apply an enhanced standard to analyze the pro-
priety of the alleged wrongdoing. 60 Moreover, claims relating to aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, and control person liability will be initiated with
greater vigor.61 Given these significant risks, inside counsel should not
serve as a director of the corporate client but should (where appropriate)
attend board of director (and key board committee) meetings as counsel.
In this way, the corporation receives the benefits of counsel's legal advice
and input without incurring the risks that otherwise would exist. 62
VII. CONCLUSION
Inside counsel today plays a vital role in rendering legal advice to the
corporate client and in shaping corporate policy. He or she is in a far
better position than outside counsel to take advantage of this advisory
role. In light of the deregulatory era that prevails today, the opportunity
exists to demonstrate that zealous government regulation is unnecessary,
burdensome, and costly. Nonetheless, this is also a period of judgment.
If private enterprise fails in this endeavor, accompanied by the onslaught
of scandal and public distrust, major federal (and state) legislation that
will indeed intrude upon corporate internal affairs will be on the horizon.
57. See MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALPRACTICE 251 (1992).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1995); Mendes
Hershman, Special Problems of Inside Counsel for Financial Institutions, 33 Bus. LAW.
1435, 1439-40 (1978); Lorne, supra note 38, at 490-95; Martin Riger, The Lawyer-Direc-
tor-"A Vexing Problem", 33 Bus. LAW. 2381 (1978).
59. See STEINBERG, supra note 57, at 251.
60. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Hershman, supra note 58, at 1440 (asserting that "as a director, the General Counsel is
likely to be held to a higher standard of care than other directors because of his [or her]
unique access to information and expertise").
61. See, e.g., In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 96,939 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
62. See STEINBERG, supra note 57, at 252.
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Hopefully, the corporate community will seize this opportunity and
thereby enhance the free enterprise system.

